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The structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the genesis of Cartesian self

Abstract. Perry and Recanati describe I-thoughts or de se thoughts as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the I doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the genesis of the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned – one of the issues addressed in the Blue Book and in the first Critique – Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns, as they both focus, although not exclusively, on the type of reference involved in the I, obviously via extremely different philosophical paths and with what may appear antipodal, metaphysical assumptions at first sight.
Keywords. Kant, Wittgenstein, I-thoughts, self-consciousness, self-reference, indexicality 

Sommario: Perry e Recanati descrivono i cosiddetti I-thoughts o pensieri de se come pensieri che rappresentano il soggetto in quanto soggetto. L’analisi della struttura degli I-thoughts è intrecciata con diverse questioni epistemiche e metafisiche. Questo contributo evidenzia il fatto che l’assenza della componente identificativa negli I-thoughts non implica che la rappresentazione Io non abbia una funzione referenziale, né comporta l’assunzione di una specifica tesi metafisica sulla natura del soggetto autocosciente. In particolare, prendendo in considerazione l’origine della tesi cartesiana sulla natura immateriale del soggetto pensante – una delle questioni affrontate dalla Critica della Ragion Pura e dal Libro blu, Kant e Wittgenstein sembrano condividere le stesse preoccupazioni filosofiche, soffermandosi entrambi sul tipo di dispositivo referenziale coinvolto negli I-thoughts per spiegare l’errore cartesiano.

1. Since Russell onward to the current debate between descriptivism and singularism – which involves both philosophy of mind and language (see Jeshion 2010) – the intuitive difference between descriptive thoughts about a particular object or individual and the so-called non-descriptive or de re thoughts, based on a relationship of acquaintance, can be grasped immediately on account of the different nature and role of the respective modes of presentation in play (see Burge, 1977; Bach, 1987; Recanati, 2009).
Based on a reconsideration of Russell’s notion of acquaintance through Evans’s neo-Fregean lesson, which explicitly takes non-descriptive modes of presentation into account, in de re thoughts the individual or object to which the thought refers is determined by a demonstrative mode of presentation specified through a relationship of information-perception linking the object to the occurrence of the thought (Recanati, 2009, 252). Descriptive representations represent their referents through the properties they instantiate, their reference being determined by the existence of whatever may satisfy such properties. Instead, non-descriptive representations represent their referents through a contextual relationship linking the occurrence of a thought with the object in question. In this context, and due to their indexical nature, non-descriptive representations are token-reflexive and, as such, display two semantic levels.
Taking up Frege’s (1918-19, 25-26) idea that “every one is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no one else”, Perry and Recanati (2009, 255) describe de se thoughts as special cases of de re thoughts. A de se thought is nothing more than a de re thought, the object of which is the same thinking subject that has produced the thought; this type of thought rests on a special relationship of acquaintance between the subject and itself through a first-person mode of presentation, referred to as the EGO mode of presentation by Recanati, and as self files – the mental particulars whereby the subject acquires first-person information – by Perry. It goes without saying that one may also formulate accidental de se thoughts, namely de re thoughts about oneself, without resorting to a first-person mode of presentation and without realising that the subject to whom the thought is referring is nobody but oneself. Castañeda, Kaplan and Perry’s examples are well known, particularly the forgetful painter who judges the painter of a particular picture very accomplished without realising that he painted it himself.
In this way, if de re thoughts require the res being thought about and the way – the mode of presentation – in which the res is thought about, then de re thoughts can generate ‘Frege cases’ (Fodor 1995); that is, those instances in which the subject does not realise that two distinct modes of presentation concern the same object and determine it as his or her own referent. To recall Kaplan’s example of a subject who thinks the thought “His pants are on fire” while looking at himself in the mirror, the subject entertains a de re thought about himself under the mode of presentation ‘that man (in the mirror)’, but he does not realise that that particular thought pertains to nobody but himself. In other words, he does not recognise ‘That man = myself’; therefore, and without irrationality, the subject can simultaneously assent to ‘I am F’ and to ‘That man is not F’. Through an example offered by Wittgenstein (1958, 67), the opposite case also exists: “It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, while in fact it is my neighbour’s”. In this example, the subject wrongly believes ‘that man = myself’; hence, he wrongly self-ascribes property F (to have the broken arm) based on the connection between two thoughts. The first, “My arm hurts”, is a judgement based on the subject’s feeling of pain through proprioception; the second thought, “that arm is broken”, is a demonstrative judgement based upon the subject’s visual perception. Through these two thoughts, and through the wrong identitification of ‘that arm = my arm’, which is grounded in the visual demonstrative ‘that arm’ used in order to determine the subject’s ‘arm that hurts’ as the referent, the subject reaches the false judgement “my arm is broken”.
According to Recanati, (a) de re thoughts may concern (a.1) someone other than oneself or (a.2) oneself. In the latter case, i.e., with de se thoughts, these can be either (a.2.1) accidental or (a.2.2) genuine, also widely referred to as I-thoughts. On the other hand, (a.2.2) genuine de se thoughts can be (a.2.2.1) explicit and grounded in an identification component, once again explicitly represented in thought, as in Kaplan’s reversed example of a subject who identifies himself in a mirror with the man whose pants are on fire. De se thoughts may also be (2.2.2) implicit and based on identification-free self-reference. As such, they are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person, as opposed to thoughts involving some explicit self-identification.
Due to the absence of identification components, the subject formulating such judgments immune to error through misidentification in given epistemic contexts cannot be mistaken as to whether it is she who is attributing a particular property to herself. The issue is introduced by Wittgenstein in The Blue and the Brown Books in his philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I: here he distinguishes two uses, the use as object (“I have grown six inches”), and the use as subject (“I have a toothache”), where no subject identification is taken into account. On this issue, it’s important to point out the classic discussions by Strawson (1966) (criterionless self-ascription), Shoemaker (1968) (self-reference without identification), and Evans (1982) (identification-free).
Several authors from Shoemaker onward have observed that, in this particular type of de se thought, the subject is not represented as a constituent in the content of thought, but rather serves as a circumstance of evaluation for the judgment in question. In other words, a de se thought does not express a complete proposition ascribing a property to the thinking subject, but simply arises from a representational content expressing the instantiation of that property. This is to say that thinking of such a content also implies the self-ascription of the property expressed by the content of the de se thought (Lewis 1979, Chisholm 1976). As shown by Wright (1998, 19), it is the peculiar epistemic ground of the first-person mode of presentation that assigns these features: For example, a judgment such as “I have pain” expresses an implicit de se thought because the way the property expressed by the predicate is instantiated (“there is pain”) – based on one’s own subjective experience focused on introspective consciousness – will be sufficient to realise that the predicate is ascribed to oneself even if the subject is not represented as a constituent in the content of the judgment. It is in this sense that “there is pain” is tantamount to “I have pain”. 
Accordingly, not all de se are also de re thoughts, as this only applies to (a.2.2.1) explicit de se thoughts; on the contrary, (b) implicit de se thoughts are not included in the class of de re thoughts because the subject is not a res that can be made the object of a representational relation​[1]​. The subject is not represented in the de se thought because this only applies to the properties instantiated in the experiential dimension​[2]​.

2. In general, it should be highlighted that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the I performs no referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis pertaining to the nature of the self-conscious subject. In fact, the I-thoughts’ self-reference features have been supported by both a materialist conception regarding the self-conscious subject as a bodily object – by Strawson and Evans, for example – and a different metaphysical framework, as in Wittgenstein’s eliminativist thesis or in Kant’s exclusion thesis. Particularly, as far as the genesis of the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned – one of the issues addressed in the Blue Book and in the first Critique – Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns, as they both focus, although not exclusively, on the type of reference involved in the I, obviously via extremely different philosophical paths and with what may appear antipodal, metaphysical assumptions at first sight.
In a well-known passage, Wittgenstein introduces his philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I, where he distinguishes two types of uses, the use as object (“I have grown six inches”) and the use as subject (“I have toothache”): 

One can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first category involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error […] On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask ‘are you sure it’s you who have pains?’ would be nonsensical (Wittgenstein 1958, 66-7).

This passage should be considered as part of the philosophical framework articulated by Wittgenstein since the 1930s on the basis of some theses that might be regarded as the back-ground for the analyses of the two uses of I. For example: a) the irreducibility of the manifold ‘games’ that build up language, the rules of which are to be made explicit in order to solve any type of philosophical problem, b) anti-referentialism, which relies on the recognition of the manifold functions performed by language, as well as on the necessity of avoiding the erroneous search for the use of a sign on the basis of the object-sign relationship, and c) anti-mentalism, according to which suggesting that thinking is a mental activity is misleading. While the I used as object performs a referential function relative to the body and to physical features in general, the I used as subject apparently regards mental states, as well as processes, but no subject identification is taken into account. From a Wittgensteinian angle, the I used as subject has no referential function: According to this thesis – supported by Geach (1957), Hacker (1972) and Anscombe (1975) – it is our inclination to assume that a linguistic term only has a meaning if it stands for an object that induces us to believe that the I used as subject denotes the thinking subject, mind, soul, etc. (cf. Sluga 1996, Wright 1998). 
The above-mentioned theses are directed towards anti-objectivism, i.e., the refusal to conceive of meaning in terms of the object and the designation model, as Wittgenstein (1953, § 293) would later use to demolish the model based on his well-known private language argument. The use of I as subject has no object (whether material or immaterial) to which to refer: The mental and the physical belong to two different language-games, and reducing their relationship to a simple formula is indefensible. Instead, it is necessary to show the differences between these games related to mental and physical properties so as to examine the grammars of first- and third-person statements.
In this way, Wittgenstein (1958, 43) begins with the analysis of language and the use of the I as subject to dissolve any issue concerning the nature of the ego in an anti-metaphysical key. Philosophical inquiry must only investigate the grammars of the mentalistic terms used – no metaphysical distinction between the mental and the physical should follow from the distinction between propositions describing facts of the world and propositions describing psychological experiences. It is necessary to analyse the uses of and related grammars for terms such as thinking, meaning and wishing because the investigation “rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some peculiar medium”. Thinking is using signs according to rules, and philosophical difficulties may only arise from those misleading uses of language that can lead us to look for something that might correspond to a noun. This may be the case with the use of the I as subject: The referential thesis, according to which the use of a sign is based on its relationship to the object (strongly criticised when taken as the sole basis to explain the semantics of the language), along with the proper consideration that some uses of the I do not denote physical properties, leads to false Cartesian metaphysical conclusions: 

We feel then that in the cases in which ‘I’ is used as subject, we don’t use it because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which however, has its seat in our body. In fact, this seem to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, ‘Cogito ergo sum’ (Wittgenstein 1958, 69). 

Briefly stated, according to the structure of I-thoughts’ features, if the “I” used as subject doesn’t denote physical proprieties, the subject is not represented in the de se or I-thought; consequently, the fact that the subject cannot be considered a res that can be made object of a representational relation creates the illusion of a Cartesian or immaterial ego. Conversely, as just said, for Wittgenstein the use of I as subject has no object (whether material or immaterial) to which to refer: The mental and the physical belong only to two different language-games.

3. In no way is the absence of identification in the use of the I a missing point in Kant, as we’ll see with the transcendental designation of the I in I think​[3]​. However, and in contrast to Wittgenstein, in the first Critique Kant moves from a metaphysical reflection in the sense of transcendental idealism concerning the conditions of possibility of experience and knowledge and from the transcendental assertion that I think is the centre of such conditions. Philosophical inquiry can only analyse the formal constraints of knowledge: In revealing the genesis of the illusion of a Cartesian, immaterial ego, mainly addressed in the analysis of paralogisms, Kant argues that nothing about the metaphysical order and the ontological nature of the thinking subject can be elicited from the conscious form of the unity of apperception or from the representational order of I think, precisely because the I in I think is not the concept of an object, but an empty representation that refers to “the concept of a mere something”. In a nutshell, given that there is no empirical intuition, the I in I think cannot be based on public employment through the identifying mediation of properties attributable to the thinking subject.
Kant attacks all metaphysical approaches that attempt to find a ‘rational doctrine of the soul’ (rationale Seelenlehre) based on the inferences that employ the concept I independently of experience. By means of such inferences, and without the conditions for the applicability of the categories to the intuitions, the rationale Seelenlehre claims to know the nature of the subject as a soul or as a thinking substance by the a priori ascription of the categories, considered as transcendental predicates, to the ‘I’, or soul, taken as noumenal object.
The representation of a subject as an essentially simple, identical substance detached from matter does not entail that the thinking self is a simple, identical substance detached from the body. These are synthetic propositions requiring not only the involvement of the categories, but also an intuition. In the transcendental system, however, intuition can only be sensible: It plays no part in the intellect nor in the field of thought; thus, the simple or empty representation I – referred to as the poorest representation of all – lies solely in that field (A346/B404) (B408).
With regard to this specific point, Kant e Wittgenstein’s approaches seem to be based on the same anti-Cartesian concerns. Both focus on representational features of I and both refuse to assume the absence of identification in the use of the I as reason to elicit a specific Cartesian thesis pertaining to the nature of the self-conscious subject. In order to explain the genesis of a Cartesian ego, Wittgenstein highlights the erroneous use of designation model for the I used as subject representation: The fact that I as subject has no material object to which to refer doesn’t imply that I refers to an immaterial thing. Conversely, Kant highlights the bare and empty features of the representation I: the fact that I is a simple representation doesn’t imply that the subject is a simple or immaterial thing.
Thus, even though both Wittgenstein and Kant reject the thesis of a Cartesian ego, they assign a very different role to the representation I. Bearing in mind the different philosophical approaches, it seems that the de se thoughts perspective discussed thus far is particularly attractive: Certain features of transcendental apperception and I think seem to anticipate certain points of this approach.

4. Kant introduces the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception in the famous passage B 131-2. This fragment condenses three important points: 
a) In order to represent something to a subject, the subject must be able to think that every representation is its own,
b) the second point consists of the complex thought based on synthetic unity: The different representations merge into one single consciousness as a thought ascribable to a subject, i.e., (T) I think that (I think that x, I think that y, I think that z, etc.). The several uses of I are co-referential – the I thinking x is identical to the I thinking y, and so forth – and the identity of the I think also concerns the higher-ranking I think upon which depends the synthesis of various representations in a single complex thought, 
c) taken together, these two points set up the necessary synthetic unity of apperception, whereby the representations of a complex thought are connected in such a way that they are linked to a single thinking subject, which ultimately entails that they make up a synthetic unity. As highlighted several times throughout the first Critique, Kant asserts that the analytical unit of apperception presupposes synthetic unity: The consciousness of the I think identity requires not only a synthesis, but also a consciousness of the synthesis identity.
I think is mainly regarded as the formal condition for all thinking: I is the representational correlate of the thinking being in the self-consciousness; as such, it designates an existence devoid of properties because it is analytically contained in the synthetic unit of apperception as the representation of ‘a something in general’ or ‘a transcendental subject’. If the self-consciousness summarised by I think does not display any property, then it is not possible to determine whether that something exists as a persistent substance to produce knowledge due to the absence of intuition (B 157; B 278): The thinking being is merely represented as a something general, unidentifiable from an epistemic perspective. All the subject knows is that it exists as a thinking activity (A 346/B 404) (cf. Capozzi, 2007).
A few peculiarities concerning the self-referential apparatus involved in the transcendental apperception are revealed. The act of reference performed by the subject to refer to itself entails no mediation of knowing; in other words, the notion of transcendental designation involves no identification through the properties ascribable to the subject. At this level, the intellectual representation I is a simple representation bearing no content, and it only designates transcendentally; that is, without any conceptual mediation.
With the notion of transcendental designation, Kant anticipates some of the self-reference without identification features (cf. Brook 2001, Forgione 2015). The condition of possibility for all judgments relies on the act ‘I think’; at this level, the intellectual representation I only designates transcendentally because no conceptual mediation is involved: It is a simple representation that has no content and merely refers to something in general, i.e., the concept of the transcendental subject - “[I]ts properties [of subject] are entirely abstracted from if it is designated merely through the expression ‘I’, wholly empty of content (which I can apply to every thinking subject)” (A 355). As an empty or bare form (A443/B471), I designates but does not represent: “For in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding, except perhaps (if one insists) the I, which is simple only because this representation has no content, and hence no manifold, on account of which it seems to represent a simple object, or better put, it seems to designate one” (A 381) (cf. Howell, 2000). 

5. In summary, the general correlate of apperception I cannot be used to constitute a de re thought: The thinking being, seen as ‘this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks’ is not a res that can be made the object of a representational relationship. While I think is the condition for every thought, I is not an explicit representational reference within the content of a judgment: It only designates transcendentally and, as such, involves neither conceptual nor intuitional mediation.
Now the issue concerns the relationship between I think and the articulation of de se thoughts. If the act of spontaneity expressed by I think is necessarily involved in the making of a judgment, then it must reside in a much more abstract level than the reflection on the distinction between implicit and explicit de se thoughts. The Kantian arguments concerning I think cannot articulate the different types of de se thoughts expressing self-ascriptions of mental and physical properties: These consider the form and condition of the possibility for any kind of judgment, regardless of the particular uses of I (as subject or object, in Wittgensteinian terms) involved in the single judgments produced. In other words, the I think mechanism of transcendental designation cannot account for the presence or absence of the representational reference of the subject in judgments such as ‘I have grown six inches’ – an explicit de se thought – or ‘I have a toothache’ – an implicit de se thought – since such is the condition of possibility for both.
Things are somewhat different with a more fundamental, implicit de se thought. As we have seen, Recanati (2007, 147) distinguishes between implicit and explicit self-ascriptions according to the distinction between the mode of representation and the content of representation. The former concerns all the information gained through the proprioceptive/kinaesthetic mode: On the basis of his proprioceptive/kinaesthetic experience, if the subject judges his legs to be crossed, then he cannot be mistaken as to whom he ascribes the property of having his or her legs crossed. If the judgment is not made ‘from the inside’ and relies on the perception of the subject’s body in the mirror, the subject will see that his legs are crossed and may misidentify the person whose legs are crossed. In this latter case, the subject is explicitly represented in the content of the representation, whereas in the former he is not represented but is implicitly determined by the mode; for this reason, the statement is ‘identification-free’. Despite this difference, the author claims that the self is always an unarticulated constituent, while every (implicit or explicit) self-ascription presupposes, in turn, a specific or more basic implicit self-ascription:
[In the mirror case], the perception is (explicitly) about myself because it is my legs which, on the basis of my visual experience, I judge to be crossed. But the perception is (implicitly) about myself also in the sense that I am the one who sees the mirror and what it shows. That the perception is mine and concerns my surroundings rather than someone else’s, is something which is guaranteed by the architecture of the system, hence gives rise to immunity (Recanati 2007, 147).

Perry expresses the same idea when he claims that the subject of every judgment is regarded as an unarticulated constituent​[4]​:





De re Thoughts	First-person thoughts
About something other than oneself	About oneself	
	Accidentally de se	Explicitly de se	Implicitly de se
		Vulnerable to EM	Immune to error through misidentification


Schema 1 summarises the articulation of the thoughts. To recall the above-mentioned example offered by Recanati, if a subject is looking in the mirror and recognises her legs as being crossed, then the thought is explicit de se because the subject features as a constituent in the content. On the other hand, the perceptual mental state involved should also be considered to be an implicit de se thought regarding its basic, implicit self-ascription, as the subject in question is the one who sees the mirror and what it shows. This is not represented in the thought’s content; instead, it is the architecture of the mind’s system, i.e., the mode of representation, which ensures that its perception belongs to the subject in question and not to someone else. In the case of the mirror, two properties in the same perceptual representation are self-ascribed by the subject, one being the property of ‘seeing in the mirror that her legs are crossed’, which is implicitly ascribed to the subject due to the perceptual mode of representation, and the other being the property of ‘having one’s legs crossed’, which is explicitly ascribed to the subject due to the fact that she is represented in the content of her own perceptual thought.
One should distinguish between a first level – in which the subjective dimension producing a thought is not represented as the producer of that thought – and a second level, in which the subject can be implicitly or explicitly represented in the content of the thought as the subject to whom a given property is attributed. Perry and Recanati’s relativist perspective articulates such two levels in compliance with specific cognitive constraints, and discards any explicit representation of the self to eventually reach Perry’s paradox, whereby some de se attitudes should be regarded as selfless.
On the contrary, and yet with the same result, for Kant, the role of the I, seen as a correlative of apperception, is preserved as the basis of synthesis. Kant’s perspective describes the two levels according to a distinction between two classes of self-ascriptions, i.e., those taking ‘I as passive’, and those taking ‘I as active’ (Refl 208, 20: 270). Following Carl’s (1998, 157) epistemological perspective, which maps this distinction onto one between spontaneity and receptivity, while the former self-ascriptions are determined by representations given in sensibility in independent ways, the ‘I as active’ is ‘the logical I’ (KGS: 20, 270), the bearer and ground of all judgments, the referent of all mental self-ascriptions expressing the act of judging one’s given representations​[5]​. 
The first level of basic, implicit self-attribution concerns the act of spontaneity – the Thinking – for it is the synthetic unit of apperception that is the origin of the representational synthesis and hence the source of the self-attribution of all thoughts. As has been pointed out, the act of spontaneity expressed by I think is necessarily involved in the making of any judgment: At this first level, the lack of an identification component entailed in the transcendental designation of I think and the resulting implicitness feature of the self-ascription of all thoughts are grounded in the Thinking features regarded as the synthetic unit of apperception that determines the I think as an analytical unity of apperception.
In fact, to think is to unify the manifold conceptually; every thought expressed by a judgment must be based on the principle of transcendental apperception. For this reason, Kant holds that the I is inherent in the very concept of thought (B132), determining the form of every judgment in general terms (B 406). In the A-edition Paralogism, Kant addresses the relationship between all thoughts and the ‘I’ taken as the common subject in which they inhere to affirm that the representation I features in all thoughts (A 350). The I of apperception seen as a ‘logically simple subject’ is analytically implied in the concepts of ‘thinking’ or ‘thoughts’’ (des Denkens) (B 407-8).
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^1	  Recanati (2009, 259): “Implicit de se thoughts are not [de re thoughts]. Their content is thetic, while the content of de re thoughts is categoric. Admittedly, explicit de se thoughts are a sort of de re thought: they are de re thoughts that involve a special mode of presentation of the res thought about, namely the ego mode of presentation. But implicit de se thoughts are not: their content corresponds to that of a predicate, and the subject of which it is predicated remains implicit”. 
^2	  It goes without saying that this is not the only option within the debate. Lewis’ perspective reverses Perry and Recanati’s terms of the issue: All types of property ascriptions are mere variations of a single kind, namely de se ascriptions. It follows that de re thoughts should be reduced to de se thoughts. Within this line of thought, which internalises the contextual relations of acquaintance in the content of thought, one should also include Searle and Higginbotham’s reflexivity perspective. Among the many studies, see García-Carpintero (2013) for an overview of the different positions.
^3	  Kantian English quotations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. As is customary, the Critique of Pure Reason is cited by the usual A/B method.
^4	  Perry (2002, 208) expounds the “Tractarian or Carnapian way of making this point” by asserting that “the world as we perceive it does not include ourselves, but has ourselves as sort of a point of origin”. As is well known, this is also, and principally, a Kantian issue, resumed – mutatis mutandis – by Schopenhauer and, through Schopenhauer, by Wittgenstein (cf. Frascolla, 2007, 204-09).
^5	  I have developed the issue in Forgione (2017).
